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Abstract 
Models of action control suggest that predicted action outcomes are ‘cancelled’ from 
perception, allowing agents to devote resources to more behaviorally-relevant 
unexpected events. These models are supported by a range of findings demonstrating 
that expected consequences of action are perceived less intensely than unexpected 
events. A key assumption of these models is that the prediction is subtracted from the 
sensory input. This early subtraction allows preferential processing of unexpected 
events from the outset of movement, thereby promoting rapid initiation of corrective 
actions and updating of predictive models. We tested this assumption in three 
psychophysical experiments. Participants rated the intensity (brightness) of observed 
finger movements congruent or incongruent with their own movements at different 
timepoints after action. Across Experiments 1 and 2, evidence of cancellation – whereby 
congruent events appeared less bright than incongruent events – was only found 200 
ms after action, whereas an opposite effect of brighter congruent percepts was 
observed in earlier time ranges (50 ms after action). Experiment 3 demonstrated that 
this interaction was not a result of response bias. These findings suggest that 
‘cancellation’ may not be the rapid process assumed in the literature, and that 
perception of predicted action outcomes is initially ‘facilitated’. We speculate that the 
representation of our environment may in fact be optimized via two opposing 
processes: The primary process facilitates perception of events consistent with 
predictions and thereby helps us to perceive what is more likely, but a later process aids 
the perception of any detected events generating prediction errors to assist model 
updating. 
Keywords: Motor Processes; Prediction; Perception; Cancellation; Sensorimotor 
Integration. 
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Public significance statement: When we perform an action we can usually predict the 
effects it will have on the environment. For example, when pressing a doorbell we 
expect to see a moving hand, to feel touch on our fingertips and to hear the bell ring. 
Previously it has been suggested that we are worse at perceiving sensations we produce 
because of processes in the brain that remove what was predicted from the sensations 
that we experience. These processes are thought to explain why we cannot tickle 
ourselves. However, the present study suggests that these processes are unlikely to 
work in the way that is commonly thought. We find evidence that we in fact have 
stronger perceptual experiences for expected effects very soon after we begin to move. 
We suggest that this finding could reflect the existence of two complementary processes 
that influence how we perceive the outcomes of our actions.   
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Introduction 
 
It has long been appreciated that action control depends on predicting the sensory 
consequences of our movements (James, 1890). We select actions based on their 
predicted outcomes (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Shin, Proctor, & 
Capaldi, 2010) and can use these predictions to generate rapid corrective actions when 
we experience deviant sensory input (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). In recent 
decades, interest has developed in the functional mechanisms via which these 
predictions may also alter the perception of action outcomes. Prompted by anecdotal 
observations that it is difficult to tickle oneself (Weiskrantz, Elliott, & Darlington, 1971), 
researchers have reported numerous experiments where events expected on the basis 
of action are perceptually attenuated. For instance, self-generated tactile forces and 
auditory tones are perceived as less intense than externally-generated events (Bays, 
Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011), and it is harder to 
detect masked arrows or low-contrast gabor patches when their orientation is 
congruent with an executed action (Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Waszak, 2010; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a; 1997b). Interestingly, signals predictable on 
the basis of action are also associated with reduced activity in early sensory brain 
regions (Blakemore et al., 1998; Shergill et al., 2013; Stanley & Miall, 2007). Therefore, it 
has been concluded that expected visual, tactile and auditory consequences of action are 
perceptually attenuated relative to their unexpected counterparts.  
 
These perceptual and neural effects have largely been interpreted under the 
Cancellation framework (Wolpert et al., 1995; see also 'Code Occupation Hypothesis'; 
Stoet & Hommel, 1999; Hommel, 2004). The Cancellation model suggests that during 
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action execution a forward model predicts the likely sensory consequences that will 
arise as a result of movement. When experienced inputs closely match those predicted 
by the motor system, they are ‘cancelled’ from perception. Such a mechanism is thought 
to enable preferential processing of unexpected events that are more likely to require 
learning or a novel response, supporting adaptive interaction with the physical and 
social world. For example, when picking up a cup of tea agents will reduce processing of 
expected sensory events (e.g., sight of grasping, pressure on the fingertips) relative to 
unexpected ones (e.g., the sight of spillage) to enable rapid initiation of corrective 
actions and updating of predictive models. Similarly, when interacting with others, 
greater processing of unexpected reactions (e.g., a frown after a wave) may facilitate 
social exchanges (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). In recent decades it has also been 
suggested that this mechanism plays a fundamental role in constructing our sense of 
agency during action (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) and that its malfunction may 
contribute to delusions of control experienced in schizophrenia and the healthy 
population (Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005; Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, 
Wolpert, & Fletcher, 2010). 
 
A key assumption of these models is that the prediction is subtracted from the sensory 
input (Bays & Wolpert, 2007). This early subtraction allows resources to be devoted to 
unexpected events from the outset of movement, thereby promoting rapid initiation of 
corrective actions and updating of predictive models. Such an early perceptual 
attenuation of expected events therefore supports smooth and finely-timed interactions 
with our physical and social environments (Wolpert et al., 1995). However, the 
timecourse of cancellation effects has not been examined. Specifically, while we know 
that imposing a delay between action and effect reduces cancellation effects (Bays et al., 
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2005; Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999) – suggesting that temporal features of the 
outcome may constitute part of the action prediction – we do not know whether 
cancellation effects reflect immediate or later influences on perception.  
 
The present experiments were conducted to assess systematically the timecourse of 
influences of action on perception. Participants abducted either their index or middle 
finger, while observing synchronized abduction of the same or opposite finger of an 
onscreen hand (constituting outcomes congruent and incongruent with expectation, 
respectively). To mirror the measure typically used in the literature testing the 
Cancellation model, we required participants to judge the intensity (brightness) of these 
congruent and incongruent outcomes at different timepoints after action (50 ms, 200 
ms, 350 ms). It should be noted that the field typically studies perceived intensity of 
tactile outcomes (e.g., ticklishness or force), but that models hypothesize comparable 
influences across all modalities where sensation can be predicted on the basis of action 
(Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Friston, 2013; Wolpert et al., 2003). The use of 
visual stimuli allowed us to isolate easily those effects due to prediction, relative to 
those due to generalized suppression of any tactile sensation on a moving effector 
regardless of whether it was predicted or not (likely mediated by spinal mechanisms; 
Seki & Fetz, 2012).  
 
We probed the perceived brightness at specific timepoints by temporarily altering the 
luminance of the outcome and requiring participants to judge its brightness relative to a 
subsequently presented reference stimulus. Brighter perception of incongruent relative 
to congruent outcomes would be predicted under the Cancellation account. Specifically, 
all models of Cancellation of which we are aware predict effects on low level attributes 
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such as tactile force and visual brightness. For example, formulations based on 
predictive coding equate phenomenal intensity (e.g., brightness contrast) with the 
precision of a sensory estimate (Brown & Friston, 2012) and suggest that cancellation 
mechanisms reduce the precision on expected sensory channels during action (Brown 
et al., 2013). If predictive attenuation occurs from the outset of an executed action, 
congruent outcomes should be perceived as less bright than incongruent outcomes as 
soon as an action has been initiated, i.e., at the earliest timepoint of 50 ms. However, if 
cancellation is in fact reflective of a later process, this effect will only be found at a delay 
after action, i.e., not at 50 ms, but at 200 ms or 350 ms.    
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In Experiment 1, participants performed finger movements while observing 
synchronized congruent and incongruent effects, and judged the brightness of these 
effects at different delays after action (50 ms, 200 ms and 350 ms).  
 
Methods 
 
Participants: Twenty-six participants (17 female, mean age = 27.5 years [SD = 9.14]) 
were recruited from Birkbeck, University of London and paid a small honorarium for 
their participation. These included ten replacements for participants who could not 
perform the necessarily challenging perceptual discrimination (Points of Subjective 
Equivalence [PSEs] were beyond the range of presented stimuli and/or acceptable 
psychometric functions could not be modelled to their responses – see below). The 
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sample size was determined a priori on the basis of pilot testing to estimate effect size. 
The experiment was performed with local ethical committee approval and in 
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
Design: A within-participants design was used with factors of Action Congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) and Delay (50, 200, 350 ms). 
 
Procedure: The experiment was conducted in MATLAB using the Cogent toolboxi. At the 
start of the trial, a hand at rest was presented on a computer monitor (Fig. 1; LCD 
monitor, 153 x 32 cm, 60 Hz, 82 DPI). Participants held down two keys on a keypad until 
an imperative cue instructed them to abduct either their index (‘1’) or middle (‘2’) 
finger. They were instructed to make large, rapid, single-movement abductions and 
their hand was visually occluded (NB. hands were not occluded during training to verify 
that participants were executing the actions as instructed). When participants abducted 
the cued finger, the neutral hand image was immediately replaced by one depicting the 
hand performing either an index or middle finger abduction for 600 ms (given the 
screen refresh rate, the effect was presented within ~16.6 ms of the action). This 
sequence resulted in apparent motion of the observed finger approximately 
synchronized with the participant’s action. At a variable time after the observed and 
executed abduction (50 ms, 200 ms, or 350 ms), the finger flashed for 100 ms at one of 
seven intensities (increased brightness by 10-70 %, in 10 % stepsii). Following an inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms a reference stimulus (the abducted finger at a central 
position between the index and middle finger locations) was presented at 40 % 
increased brightness of the observed hand for 100 ms.   
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After 400-500 ms participants judged whether the target or reference event was 
brighter, responding with a keypress made with their left thumb. They subsequently 
returned their right abducted finger to the start key, with their finger abducted 
throughout the trial until this point. The next trial started after 1000 ms. There were 
420 trials; 70 at each of the three delays in the congruent condition and 70 at each delay 
in the incongruent condition. For each combination of congruency and delay, each of the 
seven intensities (10-70 %, 10 % steps) was presented ten times. As such, for the first 
three intensity steps the target flash was less bright than the reference event, for the 
middle intensity it was of equal brightness and for the last three steps it was brighter. 
Trial type was randomized and participants completed eight practice trials.  
 
To estimate psychometric functions, responses for each individual were modelled by 
fitting cumulative Gaussians, and associated pDev statistics were calculated to establish 
each function’s goodness-of-fit (Palamedes toolbox, Kingdom & Prins, 2009). 
Participants with unacceptably poor fits (pDev < 0.05 for any function) were not 
analyzed further. This procedure was performed separately for congruent and 
incongruent response data for each delay level. In each condition, bias was inferred 
from the PSE and precision from the difference threshold. The PSE describes the point 
where participants judge the target and reference events to have equal brightness, with 
lower values indicative of brighter percepts. Judgement precision was inferred from the 
standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution which best fits the data; it pertains to 
the inverse of the slope, with lower thresholds reflecting more consistent 
categorizations, thereby indicating better performance (see Fig. 2). 
 
Results  
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PSE and precision values were analyzed with separate ANOVAs. No significant effects 
were found in the precision data (all p > .595). However, the PSE analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Delay, F(2,50) = 32.830, p < .001, ηp2 = .568, alongside a 
significant interaction between Delay and Action Congruency, F(2,50) = 5.530, p = .007, 
ηp2 = .181. This interaction was driven by lower PSEs for congruent (mean = 30.7 %, 
SEM = 2.14 %) than incongruent (mean = 34.0 %, SEM = 2.11%) action outcomes at 50 
ms delay (t(25) = 2.236, p = .035, d = .301), higher PSEs for congruent outcomes at 200 
ms (congruent mean = 39.5%, SEM = 1.74 %; incongruent mean = 37.2 %, SEM = 1.75 
%; t(25) = 2.875, p = .008, d = .260), and no effect of congruency at the 350 ms delay 
(t(25) = .383, p = .705, d = .042; see Fig. 2).  
 
Reaction times (RTs) for the unspeeded perceptual judgements were also analyzed 
using a repeated measures ANOVA. There were no significant effects (all p>.219).  
 
Discussion 
 
These findings demonstrate that congruent outcomes are perceived to be brighter at 50 
ms delay (lower PSE = brighter target percept), but this effect switches to brighter 
perception of incongruent outcomes at 200 ms. Strikingly, this result contrasts with 
assumptions made by the Cancellation model, whereby brighter perception of 
incongruent outcomes would be expected at all time-ranges.   
 
 
Experiment 2 
 11 
 
 
The findings of Experiment 1 are difficult to reconcile with current formulations of the 
Cancellation model, given that cancellation effects are not observed at early timepoints 
(50 ms). However, this switching from a facilitatory to attenuating influence on 
perception is reminiscent of ‘inhibition of return’ effects observed in the spatial 
attention literature (Posner & Cohen, 1984). Unsurprisingly, attending towards a spatial 
location facilitates perception of events presented nearby. However, spatially localized 
perceptual decrements are observed shortly after facilitatory effects. In Experiment 1, 
when participants abducted their index finger, an observed ‘congruent’ event both 
matched the digit moved (e.g., index finger) and spatial location (e.g., both stimulus and 
response events were on the left of fixation). Given that attention is known to modulate 
perceived brightness (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004), it is possible that the effects in 
Experiment 1 reflect the spatial location of action effects rather than their action 
(effector) congruency. Experiment 2 removed simple spatial congruency first by 
rotating the response hand 90° with respect to the observed hand, such that both index 
and middle finger movements were at body midline. Second, half of participants judged 
the brightness of non-action rather than action stimuli presented at the same spatial 
locations. If effects were equivalent in Action and No Action conditions, spatial locations 
would appear to drive effects, but if they were only present in the Action condition, they 
would appear dependent on observation of a predicted action outcome (observation of 
finger abduction rather than an arbitrary event at the same location).  
 
The 350 ms delay was also removed given that effects were not observed at this delay in 
Experiment 1, and the task was modified such that action type was self-selected rather 
than cued by an imperative, thus removing any congruency between imperative cues 
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and the observed movement. Finally, an arbitrary square was used as the reference 
stimulus, removing any potential congruency between responses and the reference 
event. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants: Twenty-six new participants (21 female, mean age = 24 years [SD = 5.67]) 
were recruited. Three were replacements for participants who could not complete the 
perceptual discrimination. Participants were randomly allocated to either the Action or 
No Action condition (see below), creating two groups of thirteen. The sample size was 
determined a priori on the basis of the effect size in Experiment 1. Inclusion criteria, as 
well as ethical support, were the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
Design: A mixed design was used, with the between-participants factor of Stimulus 
(Action, No Action) and the within-participants factors of Action Congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) and Delay (50, 200 ms). 
 
Procedure: The stimuli and procedure used in Experiment 2 were identical to that of 
Experiment 1 with the following changes. The keypad was rotated 90°, such that both 
index and middle finger movements were at body midline, and participants were free to 
execute either an index or middle finger lift on each trial rather than responding to an 
imperative. Participants were instructed to perform roughly equal numbers of each 
movement in a random sequence. When participants lifted their finger, the neutral hand 
image (CRT monitor; 32 x 24 cm, 85 Hz, 21 DPI) was immediately (within ~11.8 ms, 
given the screen refresh rate) replaced by the target stimulus. For participants in the 
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Action condition, this image was identical to Experiment 1. In contrast, participants in 
the No Action condition saw a square overlaid on either the index or middle finger 
(neutral hand image), matching the action event for hue and luminance. At 50 or 200 ms 
after the participant’s action the abducted finger/square would flash iii for 100 ms 
before returning to its original brightness level for a further 300 ms. Following a 1000 
ms ISI, a reference square was presented for 100 ms (see Fig. 1).  
 
Participants completed at least 280 trials; 70 at each of the two delays in the congruent 
and incongruent conditions. The experiment was divided into four blocks. The first 
three blocks each comprised 70 trials, while the fourth ran until participants had 
completed 140 trials of each lift. In breaks between blocks participants were given 
feedback on-screen regarding the distribution of their responses. Responses beyond the 
140th trial for each movement were not recorded.  
 
Results 
 
PSE and precision values were analyzed via separate ANOVAs. No significant effects 
were found in the precision data (all p > .078). However, the PSE analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Delay, F(1,24) = 37.077, p < .001, ηp2 = .607, alongside a 
significant interaction between Delay and Action Congruency, F(1,24) = 6.497, p = .018, 
ηp2 = .213 and a three-way interaction between Delay, Action Congruency and Stimulus, 
F(1,24) = 4.840, p = .038, ηp2 = .168. 
 
To clarify the nature of this three-way interaction we conducted separate two-way 
ANOVAs looking at the effects of Action Congruency and Delay in each Stimulus 
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condition (Action, No Action). These analyses revealed that while an interaction 
between Action Congruency and Delay was found in the Action condition, F(1,12) = 
9.924, p=.008, ηp2 = .453, this interaction was absent in the No Action condition, F(1,12) 
= .070, p = .795.  Simple effects analyses found that the effects obtained in Experiment 1 
were replicated in the Action condition - at the 50 ms delay PSEs were lower for 
congruent (mean = 30.03 %, SEM = 2.35 %) than incongruent (mean = 33.31 %, SEM = 
1.89 %) outcomes (t(12) = 2.395, p = .034, d = .350), while PSEs were higher for 
congruent (mean = 38.7 %, SEM = 2.4 %) than incongruent (mean = 35.7 %, SEM = 2.69 
%) action outcomes at the 200 ms delay (t(12) = 2.470, p = .029, d = .311; see Fig. 2). 
Like Experiment 1, these findings demonstrate that congruent outcomes are perceived 
to be brighter at 50 ms delay, but the effect switches to brighter perception of 
incongruent outcomes at 200 ms. In contrast, and in line with the non-significant 
interaction, no effects of Action Congruency were detected in the No Action condition at 
either the 50 ms (p = .747) or 200 ms delays (p = .949). 
 
RTs for the unspeeded perceptual judgements were also analyzed with a mixed model 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant effect of Action Congruency - F(1,24) = 
5.132, p = .033 , ηp2 = .176 – with faster judgments for incongruent (mean = 641.1  ms, 
SEM = 62.6 ms) relative to congruent (mean = 667.2 ms, SEM = 65.0 ms) outcomes iv. 
There were no other main effects and no interactions (all p >.103). We repeated the PSE 
analysis including the congruent-incongruent difference in mean RT for each 
participant as a covariate. The key three-way interaction between Action Congruency, 
Delay and Stimulus was also significant when this covariate was included, F(1,23) = 
6.982, p =.015, ηp2 = .233, as was the two-way interaction between Action Congruency 
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and Delay in the Action condition, F(1,11) = 6.406, p=.028, ηp2 = .368. The same two-way 
interaction remained non-significant in the No Action condition (p=.919). 
 
Discussion 
 
These findings in the Action condition provide further support for the idea that 
predictive attenuation of expected action outcomes does not occur immediately after 
action execution, but at a delay. Interestingly, the results provide further evidence for an 
early facilitation of expected outcomes, contrary to the predictions of the Cancellation 
model. Moreover, the persistence of both effects having controlled for simple spatial 
features of stimuli, and their absence in the No Action condition, suggests that the 
underlying mechanisms are sensitive to the expected identity of action effects, rather 
than simply where in space they occur.   
 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence of early increased intensity judgements for 
congruent stimuli, followed by increased intensity judgements for incongruent stimuli 
at delay. The PSE measure was chosen because Cancellation theories predict that action 
should bias perceived intensity, such that you are biased to perceive events as less 
intense when congruent with action. However, PSE measures of perceptual biasing can 
also be influenced by response biasing. For example, in Experiments 1 and 2, event 
types may be always perceived with equivalent intensity, but the PSEs may differ if 
participants are biased to select the first interval when the event is congruent with 
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expectations at 50 ms and the second interval when the event is congruent with 
expectations at 200 ms.  
 
Therefore, we designed a version of the task where response biases could be dissociated 
from perceptual biasing. To this end, Experiment 3 presented a similar set-up to 
Experiment 2 (Action condition) but changed the nature of the question asked. Rather 
than performing a comparative judgment (was the first or second event brighter?), 
participants performed an equality judgment (were the two events the same or 
different brightness?). Gaussians were now fitted to their responses rather than 
Cumulative Gaussians (see Figure 2). The PSE was derived as the mean of the function 
and the precision was the standard deviation. This task has the important advantage 
that it precludes selection of a particular stimulus as more intense on a given trial, and 
ensures that biases to select a particular response alternative no longer influence the 
PSE value (Han & VanRullen, 2016; Schneider & Komlos, 2008). Therefore, if effects in 
Experiments 1 and 2 are a function of response bias they will not be found in this 
experiment. In contrast, PSE effects determined by perceptual biases will remain.   
 
Methods 
 
Participants: Twenty-six new participants (19 female, mean age = 24.7 years [SD = 4.1]) 
were recruited. Four were replacements for participants who could not complete the 
perceptual discrimination. Sample size was determined a priori on the basis of the effect 
size in Experiments 1 and 2. Inclusion criteria, as well as ethical support, were the same 
as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Design: A within-participants design was used with factors of Action Congruency 
(congruent, incongruent) and Delay (50, 200 ms). 
 
Procedure: The procedure used was identical to the Action condition in Experiment 2. 
However, participants were not asked to report which stimulus was brighter (first or 
second) but whether the presented stimuli had the same brightness or different 
brightness. The stimuli shown were the same as those in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Responses were again recorded via keypresses with the participant’s left thumb.  
 
Results 
 
PSE and precision values were analyzed via separate ANOVAs. No significant effects 
were found in the precision data (all p > .165). However, the PSE analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Delay, F(1,25) = 18.911, p<.001, ηp2 = .431, alongside a 
significant interaction between Delay and Action Congruency, F(1,24) = 7.125, p = .013, 
ηp2 = .222. This interaction reflected the same pattern as observed in Experiments 1 and 
2. At the 50 ms delay PSEs were lower for congruent outcomes (mean = 34.0 %, SEM = 
2.44 %) than incongruent outcomes (36.3 %, SEM =2.62 %; t(25) = 2.326, p = .028, d = 
.174). The opposite pattern was seen at the 200 ms delay, with lower PSEs for 
incongruent outcomes (mean = 39.2 %, SEM = 2.39 %) than congruent outcomes (mean 
= 40.2 %, SEM = 2.37 %), although the difference at this delay did not reach statistical 
significance – t(25) = 1.613, p = .119.  
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RTs to make the unspeeded perceptual judgements were also analyzed with a repeated 
measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all 
p>.418).  
 
Discussion 
 
In summary, the same broad pattern of results was found as that in Experiments 1 and 
2. Crucially, the effects of congruency once again varied as a function of timecourse, 
confirming that the equivalent effects in Experiments 1 and 2 are not driven by 
response bias. At the early interval we replicated the enhancement effect. However, we 
did not observe such convincing evidence of a later ‘cancellation’ effect. We propose that 
a likely reason for this difference with respect to Experiments 1 and 2 is that the task 
used in Experiment 3 was more difficult, producing noisier PSE estimates and resulting 
in a signal that was less reliably detected. It is worth noting that the cancellation effect 
has been found multiple times in previous experiments (i.e., it is the early effect / 
interaction with respect to timecourse that represents the novelty relative to previous 
studies) and that previous work explicitly comparing judgment types in similar 
psychophysical tasks suggests that equality judgments have reduced sensitivity to 
effects on perceived intensity when compared to comparative judgments (Anton-
Erxleben, Abrams & Carrasco, 2010). This explanation is consistent with the 
observation that modelled functions were less precise relative to Experiments 1 and 2 
(mean in Experiments 1 and 2 = 19.6 %; mean in Experiment 3 = 23.1 %; see also v).  
 
Nevertheless, importantly this experiment conclusively supports the finding of 
Experiments 1 and 2 that predictive attenuation of expected action outcomes does not 
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occur immediately after action execution - that the influence of action on perception 
interacts with delay, and that in these early timeranges there is in fact a facilitatory 
influence.  
 
 
Cross-experiment analysis: Response selection-perception relationship 
 
In Experiment 1, responses were cued and therefore there was a random relationship 
between the responses on trial N and trial N-1 as well as between the responses on trial 
N and the stimuli on trial N-1 (note also that reaction times to execute these unspeeded 
responses were equivalent when responses were the same and alternating with respect 
to the previous trial, t(25) = .042 , p = .967, and when they were imitative or counter-
imitative with respect to the preceding stimuli, t(25) = .987, p = .333). In Experiments 2 
and 3 participants chose voluntarily which actions to execute to remove any potential 
confounds related to imperative stimuli. In both experiments additional analyses 
demonstrated that participants showed a tendency to select actions which differed from 
the executed action on the preceding trial (to ‘alternate’; Experiment 2: mean = 57.5 %, 
t(25) = 2.676, p = .013; Experiment 3: mean = 59.1 %, t(25) = 3.236, p = .003) and from 
the observed action on the preceding trial (to ‘counter-imitate’; Experiment 2: mean = 
52.6 %, t(25) = 2.136, p =.043 ; Experiment 3: mean = 55.1 %, t(25) = 5.280, p = 
.003).  In principle, despite the lengthy temporal separation between the trials, these 
biases could provide additional sources of expectation that are confounded with action-
effect congruency and which could therefore contribute to our observed perceptual 
effects.  
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To investigate this possibility, for each participant we analyzed the proportion of 
alternation choices and counter-imitative choices using a binomial test. This analysis 
allowed us to classify participants as either ‘alternators’ or ‘non-alternators’ (19 and 20 
participants, respectively) and ‘counter-imitators’ or ‘non-counter-imitators’ (15 and 24 
participants, respectively). We then conducted an additional factorial ANOVA on our 
PSE data, collapsed across Experiments 2 and 3 for maximal power (participants in the 
No Action condition of Experiment 2 were excluded as this group showed no perceptual 
effects). We included the same within-participants factors as in our main analyses 
(Action Congruency and Delay), and added the between-participants factors of 
Alternation (alternator, non-alternator) and Counter-imitation (counter-imitator, non-
counter-imitator).  This analysis found that the interaction between Action Congruency 
and Delay identified in our experiments did not significantly differ between the groups 
defined according to Alternation (F(1,35) = .994, p=.326) or Counter-imitation 
(F(1,35)=1.638, p=.209), and the four-way interaction between Action Congruency, 
Delay, Alternation and Counter-imitation was also found to be non-significant (F(1,35) = 
.236, p=.630). Therefore, these analyses suggest that the relationships between 
responses on trial N and responses / stimuli presented on trial N-1 did not contribute to 
the perceptual effects observed.  
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
These experiments find evidence that congruent action outcomes are perceived with 
greater brightness 50 ms after action execution, while incongruent action outcomes 
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appeared brighter at a 200 ms delay.  Importantly, both effects demonstrate specificity 
to perceived actions rather than spatial locations.   
 
These results are inconsistent with current formulations of the Cancellation model. 
First, our results suggest that predictive attenuation does not emerge immediately after 
action, but at delay. This finding conflicts with the traditional assumption that the 
prediction is subtracted from the sensory input (Bays & Wolpert, 2007), promoting 
rapid initiation of corrective actions and updating of predictive models. Therefore, 
although forward models may allow rapid initiation of corrective action, it is perhaps 
unlikely that any perceptual cancellation aids the rapid corrections. However, 
perceptual ‘cancellation’ may still support a range of other functions hypothesized in 
the literature. For example, ideomotor theorists have appreciated that the tendency of 
actual and anticipated sensory effects to prime responses (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 
2001; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004) may generate a 
‘perseveration loop’ – with agents performing actions, producing effects, and having the 
same actions subsequently primed by the effects they have produced (Mackay, 1986). 
Attenuated processing of self-produced action effects could act to prevent such 
perseverative loops (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a); even if such attenuations are 
generated at delay. Similarly, a later cancellation process may still be suitable for the 
agentive labelling of self-generated events (Frith et al., 2000).  
 
Second, our results reveal an early ‘facilitating’ influence of prediction on perception, 
such that events congruent with expectation are perceived to be brighter than 
incongruent events. While this effect is not predicted under the Cancellation model, it in 
fact appears consistent with some other observations within the action literature. For 
 22 
 
instance, agents are sometimes better at detecting visual motion congruent with action 
(Christensen et al., 2011;2014; Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2014), and computational 
models of perception consider detection to be related to perceived intensity such that 
the detection threshold reflects the lower bound of perceptible intensities (Brown et al., 
2013). Additionally, and likely relatedly, ambiguous inputs (e.g. illusions, binocular 
rivalry) are typically resolved in line with executed movements (Di Pace & Saracini, 
2014; Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 2007; Wohlschläger, 2000).  
 
Interestingly, these ‘facilitatory’ influences of prediction are also consistent with 
observations outside of the action literature. It is a common finding in visual cognition 
that events predictable on the basis of other environmental information are more 
readily detectable (e.g., a loaf of bread is identified more accurately in the context of a 
kitchen; Palmer, 1975), and perceived with greater intensity and contrast than 
unexpected events (Bar, 2004; Han & VanRullen, 2016; Floris de Lange, personal 
communication). These findings are taken as support for Bayesian models of 
perception, whereby accurate percepts within our noisy environment are generated by 
using prior expectations to constrain sensory evidence such that we perceive more 
readily what we expect (Yuille & Kersten, 2006), rather than what we do not expect 
(‘Cancellation’ model). These processes are argued to aid the generation of veridical 
percepts, given that expected events are (by definition) more likely to occur. Notably, 
these adaptive arguments would seem to apply equivalently regardless of whether 
sensation is predicted on the basis of action or another environmental cue. While these 
arguments relate to the adaptive nature of detecting predicted over unpredicted events, 
current computational models require that any mechanism acting to facilitate detection 
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of predicted events will also increase the apparent intensity of suprathreshold stimuli 
(Brown et al., 2013).  
Several current theoretical frameworks examine mechanisms for generating both 
attenuation and facilitation effects but cannot explain our observed interaction across 
time. For instance, Lally, Frendo and Diedrichsen (2011) suggest that the nervous 
system may be able to attenuate or facilitate self-generated stimuli on the basis of task 
demands, while Desantis et al. (2014) suggest that opposite effects may be found in 
intensity judgement and identification tasks (see also Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012, for a 
demonstration of how neural attenuation may be related to behavioural facilitation). 
However, such explanations are difficult to apply to our findings given that task-
demands and dependent variables were identical at short and long delays.  
Our findings are potentially consistent with the Code Occupation hypothesis (Stoet & 
Hommel, 1999). Under this account, preparation of an action initially activates codes 
associated with that action. This activation facilitates responses which require these 
codes (Stoet & Hommel, 1999; 2002) and may also enhance perception of associated 
events. However, activating codes does not form an action plan; a stage which involves 
binding feature codes in a manner akin to feature integration theory for object 
representation (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984). When features are bound into a single 
event representation – as required for completion of the action plan – the codes are 
‘occupied’, generating attenuated perception of events activating them (Müsseler & 
Hommel, 1997a; 1997b). Given that these mechanisms generating perceptual 
facilitation followed by attenuation are proposed to operate in order to generate action 
plans, one might expect that this framework would hypothesize the perceptual shift to 
occur prior to action execution, and therefore that it could only explain the attenuating 
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influences observed in the present study. However, in principle one might speculate 
that our interaction could be incorporated within this account if assuming that the 
codes are not fully bound by the time of action initiation or that the binding required for 
initiation does not generate perceptual attenuation immediately.  
Alternatively, we speculate that a viable model may reconcile reasoning from 
Cancellation action models and facilitatory visual cognition models. A primary process 
enhances perception of expected events and a later process facilitates perception of 
events generating prediction errors. A primary facilitatory process may more typically 
lead to veridical percepts within our inherently noisy sensory environment, increasing 
detection of expected events that are more likely, and via the same mechanism (Brown 
et al., 2013), increasing the perceived intensity of suprathreshold stimulation. The 
mechanism generating these effects may be the same as the expectation-based process 
thought to facilitate expected percepts within visual cognition (Yuille & Kersten, 2006; 
Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). However, if we still perceive unexpected information 
despite these biases – as will be the case with suprathreshold sensory events as 
presented here – later processes may enhance the processing of unexpected events. 
Enhanced processing of events generating prediction errors will help the updating of 
models of the world and the preparation of novel responses – the functional role 
presently assigned to ‘cancellation’ under existing models. Under this speculative 
account, the apparent paradox in the literature where expected events are cancelled in 
action contexts, and facilitated outside of action contexts, may be only apparent – in fact 
largely generated by the different measures typically used in the two fields (intensity 
judgements of suprathreshold stimulation and detection of at-threshold events, 
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respectively). Future work must importantly address whether both processes operate 
similarly in both contexts.  
We propose that spatial attention mechanisms may generate these later cancellation 
effects. For example, eye-tracking paradigms demonstrate that we overtly attend 
towards events which are unexpected in either spatial or temporal dimensions (Itti & 
Baldi, 2009). Attention is known to increase perceived contrast (Carrasco, Ling & Read, 
2004; Liu, Abrams & Carrasco, 2009), and therefore could generate the observed effects. 
Importantly such a process is consistent with the emergence of cancellation at later 
timepoints, given that we may assume we perceive a surprising event before 
reallocating attentional resources towards it (see Figure 3).  
Our dual-process model assumes that prediction lies at the heart of the observed effects, 
but of course it must be noted that sensory events were not predictable on the basis of 
action in the present experiment. A motor command to lift one’s index finger was 
followed on 50 % of trials by observation of an index finger movement and on the other 
50 % by a middle finger movement. Our logic assumes that prior experience has 
established predictive relationships – a prior contingent relationship has existed 
between executed and observed actions (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press & Heyes, 2014; 
Hommel et al., 2001) – and that the non-contingent experience present in the 
experiment is insufficient to extinguish these predictions (Baeyens et al., 2005). Under 
this assumption, the effects observed here would also be predicted in paradigms where 
contingent relationships are present within the context of the experiment (see Badets et 
al., 2016 for a review).   
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In conclusion, while the cancellation concept has had a significant impact on research 
programmes in motor control, computational psychiatry, social cognition and the study 
of agentive awareness, our data question a key assumption of the cancellation account – 
that the prediction is subtracted from the sensory input, generating immediate 
cancellation effects. Here we have presented evidence that prediction initially facilitates, 
rather than attenuates, perception of expected sensory events, and that evidence of 
‘cancellation’ can only be found in later time ranges. These findings suggest that 
influences of action prediction on perception may be more similar than appreciated to 
those outside of action contexts.  
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Figure 1. The timecourse for the action-related events (created using Smith Micro Software’s 
Poser 7.0) in the three experiments. 
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Figure 2. Top panel, Left: Demonstration of how the PSE was calculated in Experiments 1 and 2 
with psychometric functions for an example participant, for stimuli congruent (saturated) and 
incongruent (faded) with action. The PSE describes the point where participants judge the 
target and reference events to have equal brightness. When observers overestimate the physical 
brightness of the target stimulus PSEs tend towards lower values. Top panel, Right: 
Demonstration of how the PSE was calculated in Experiment 3 for an example participant. 
Middle panel: PSEs for stimuli congruent and incongruent with action, for all experiments and 
conditions. Solid colours indicate PSEs for action congruent events, faded colours for 
incongruent events. Bottom panel: Congruency effects, calculated as incongruent PSE – 
congruent PSE, for each delay in all experiments and conditions. Positive values indicate that 
congruent effects were perceived more brightly than incongruent effects, negative values 
indicate that congruent effects were perceived less brightly than incongruent effects, and zero 
values (black dashed line) indicate no difference. Error bars represent the standard error of the 
mean. 
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Figure 3. A schematic of our speculative model. Before action initiation, the activation of 
congruent sensory event representations increases via prediction mechanisms. When 
congruent events are presented, the activation of these representations increases further. When 
incongruent events are presented, the activation of incongruent representations is initially 
lower, as they have not been activated via prediction mechanisms. Therefore, at early probes 
after presentation (50 ms) congruent events will be associated with greater activation of 
underlying sensory representations than incongruent events. However, once incongruent – 
surprising – events have been detected, evidence suggests that we shift our attention towards 
these events. This attentional shift would increase the activation of the sensory representations 
associated with the surprising events. Therefore, at later probes (200 ms) incongruent events 
can be associated with greater activation of underlying sensory representations than congruent 
events. However, it should be noted that these ‘cancellation’ effects – where incongruent 
activation is relatively higher than congruent activation rather than simply equivalent – require 
at least one of two conditions to be met. First, the increase in activation according to later 
attentional shifts must exceed that generated by initial predictive activation. Second, the 
activation of the (unsurprising) predicted representation has already started to decay.  (NB. 
This model does not assume that a ‘sensory representation’ is singular per se. At minimum, each 
representation will likely be encoded at a population level, and furthermore, under predictive 
coding schemes these would refer to the sum of activation in ‘prediction’ and ‘input’ units).    
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Footnotes 
                                                          
i Developed by the Cogent 2000 team at the FIL and the ICN and Cogent Graphics developed by 
John Romaya at the LON at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging 
ii The luminance of the brightest point on the finger was ~36 cd/m2 before it flashed, rising to a 
maximum of ~75 cd/m2, with stepsizes of ~5.5 cd/m2. Luminance was measured with a Konica 
Minolta Chromometer CS1000A in both experiments. 
iii The luminance of the brightest point on the finger was ~17 cd/m2 before it flashed, rising to a 
maximum of ~37 cd/m2, with stepsizes of ~3 cd/m2. The square’s luminance was ~13 cd/m2 
before it flashed, rising to a maximum of ~33 cd/m2 with stepsizes of ~3 cd/m2 (note that the 
luminance of the square was matched to the mean luminance of the finger rather than the 
brightest point). 
iv We speculate that this advantage in RTs for judgments on incongruent trials is driven by the 
fact that, by the point in the trial where responses are given, observers will have entered the 
later perceptual stage where incongruent events receive a relative processing advantage (see 
General Discussion and Figure 3). 
v Also note that the flip in effect with one minor stimulus manipulation (50 ms vs 200 ms delay), 
along with its disappearance with another (No Action condition; Experiment 2) and the nature 
of the response in Experiments 1 and 2 (unrelated to the nature of expected events – 
participants reported whether a certain stimulus attribute applied to a first or second event – 
and about which participants are unlikely to have had any pre-conceived notions about how 
expectation would have related to this attribute – brightness) are all features that have been 
proposed to render response bias accounts less likely (Firestone & Scholl, 2015).   
